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1. Introduction 
Combatting climate change requires mitigation policies that abate greenhouse gas emissions 
as well as adaptation policies that buffer against the impacts. One of the problems that decision 
makers face concerns the complexity involved in assessing policy options—comparing, on the 
one hand, potential gains in agricultural productivity, biodiversity, and sea level stability 
resulting from mitigation policy against the risk of higher energy/transportation prices, lower 
economic growth rates, lost employment opportunities in some sectors and reduced competition 
in certain markets. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
economic methods present a solution: they are designed to “measure diverse benefits and 
harms…to arrive at overall judgments about value” (IPCC 2014b, 24).2 For instance, Cost-
Benefit Analysis (CBA) measures total costs of a policy against benefits from reduced climatic 
 
1Earlier versions of this paper were presented at The Ethical Underpinnings of Climate Economics Conference, 
University of Helsinki, November 2014 and at the Conceptual Analyses in Environmental Philosophy session at the 
Pacific meeting of the American Philosophical Association, April 2015. For helpful comments on drafts of this 
paper thanks to: Ariel Mendez, Ben Miller, Sara Mrsny, Carlos Nuñez, Duncan Purves, Matthew Rendall, Tamar 
Schapiro, and Debra Satz. Thanks also to John Broome, Mark Budolfson, Josh Cohen, Chris Field, Peter Hawke, RJ 
Leland, and Katy Meadows for helpful conversations about many of the ideas in this paper.  
2 Climate economists William Nordhaus and Nicolas Stern both emphasize the diversity of effects involved in climate 
change, which they measure in terms of the monetary value of goods and services, where labor, savings, knowledge 
and natural resources generate goods and services. The Stern Review conceives of these goods and services broadly in 
terms of four dimensions: consumption, education, health, and the environment. (Stern 2007, 31). In A Question of 
Balance, Nordhaus emphasizes that climate change—as well as any other policy issue—requires the proper 
measurement of what he calls economic welfare. When properly measured, economic welfare includes “everything of 
value to people” (Nordhaus 2008, 4). 
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changes on a monetary scale and sums them. A policy is justified when the result is positive and 
the benefits outweigh the costs.  
Despite presenting an elegant way to resolve the challenge of diverse effects, economic 
methods invite serious criticisms. Economics “cannot account for all ethical principles” nor can 
it “take account of justice and rights” (IPCC 2014b).3 Indeed, philosopher Simon Caney argues 
that aggregation should be suspended in assessments that compare potential human rights 
violations to economic productivity and general wellbeing (Caney 2010). In this paper, I argue 
that it would be too quick to completely rule out the application of aggregative methods in 
assessing climate change policy. I offer an alternative diagnosis of aggregative economic 
methods based on the differences or “asymmetries” in the moral significance of “harms” and 
“benefits” appropriately defined (§2). I argue that while traditional economic methods fail to 
accommodate the moral difference between harms and benefits, it is possible to design 
aggregation methods to be more morally sensitive by assigning greater weight to certain harms 
or by creating aggregation functions that represent the moral asymmetries between diverse 
effects (§3 & §4). 
2. Harm, benefit, and asymmetry 
a. Suffering harm 
 
3 CBA does not take into consideration historical responsibility. For example, CBA would assign the loss of a Pacific 
island to sea level rise a relatively small value, which can easily be outweighed by other benefits regardless of whether 
the loss of the island results from wrongdoing (IPCC 2014b). Further, CBA cannot help us to identify who should get 
compensation for a wrong done. Second, economic methods have difficulty capturing the value of lost lives and other 
non-market values (e.g. species, ecosystems, works of art), which some argue cannot be valued on a monetary scale. 
Third, CBA is too insensitive to the enormous economic inequalities present in the climate change policy context, 
including inequality across time. Finally, CBA faces challenges when it comes to including the tiny uncertainties of 
enormous catastrophes from climate change in their analysis in part because calculations of expected utility often 
assume a normal or quadratic distribution of risk (See Weitzman 2009 and Nordhaus 2011). 
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A fully adequate account of harm has yet to be developed. The most influential to date has 
been that of Joel Feinberg. In Harm to Others, Feinberg’s aim is to give an account of wrongful 
harm—the sense of harm required to justify coercive punishment under criminal law. Feinberg’s 
concept of wrongful harm can be roughly described as follows: Person A wrongfully harms 
Person B if A causes B to suffer harm in a way that violates B’s rights (Feinberg 1984). The 
concept of wrongful harm contains within it a broader, more basic or more fundamental notion of 
“suffering harm,” which Feinberg understands in terms of having one’s interests setback 
compared to a baseline. A fundamental difference between wrongful harm and suffering harm is 
that freak acts of nature can cause a person to suffer harm, but only other people can inflict 
wrongful harms. What separates suffering harm from wrongful harm is that suffering harm does 
not have an “essential moral charge” in the way that wrongful harm does. Suffering harm is more 
like “killing”. Killing is not always wrong, unlike murder, which has a built-in moral charge 
(Shiffrin 2012, 3). When people suffer harm or are at risk of suffering harm, questions arise 
regarding the moral status of the actions and events that brought about the harm and/or about 
what should be done to prevent, reduce, or alleviate it.  
A central debate over the nature of harm focuses on the question of what it is to suffer harm.4 
Suffering harm is very important given that a goal of most governments is to reduce it. But what 
 
4 Several proposals are on offer to determine what constitutes a harm. “Comparative” accounts, like Feinberg’s, define 
suffering harm in terms of having an interest setback compared to a relevant baseline (where an interest is a discrete 
aspect of a person’s well-being). Other comparativists define harm in terms of setbacks only to certain core interests. 
For example, Stephen Perry argues that suffering harm involves the worsening of core interests compared to a 
historical baseline. What is included in the core set of interests is a matter of some debate (Perry 2003, 1306-07). The 
so called “non-comparative” accounts define suffering harm in terms of an objective list of evil conditions, where the 
items on the list can be given some unified justification for making it to the list (Shiffrin 1999; Shiffrin 2012; Harman 
2004). Elizabeth Harman appeals to human functioning—or what she calls a “healthy bodily state”—to identify what 
unifies the conditions of harm (2004, 96), and Shiffrin’s admittedly incomplete account understands harm in terms of 
what is in accord with a person’s will (1999, 124). David Velleman raises an objection against Shiffrin’s view: 
determining what counts as a harm in terms of what a person would will adds a subjective dimension to harm that 
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counts as suffering harm? If suffering harm could include any loss, including mere offense, 
disgust, annoyance, and minor hurts, then the government mandate to reduce harm would 
oppressively (and absurdly) extend to most corners of human life as public safety organizations 
turn their attention to correcting bad taste and rude behavior as well as reducing the number of 
toes stubbed per year. Moreover, the importance of the goal of reducing harm would come under 
suspicion, as reducing dissatisfaction and hurt feelings is simply lower on the priority list than 
reducing highway deaths and issuing chemical safety regulations.5 Therefore, an account of 
suffering harm needs to do (at least) two things:  
• First, it needs to distinguish between suffering harm and mere loss.  
• Second, it needs to do so in a way that captures harm’s priority.  
Rather than take space to attempt to defend a complete account of harm, I will appeal instead 
to the considerable amount of overlap among different accounts of suffering harm. Shiffrin 
suggests a provisional list of what accounts of harm should include: “physical injuries, many 
physical disabilities, many mental disabilities, some material inabilities, incidents of pain, the 
failure or ruin of certain sorts of important projects and relationships, some losses, and [some 
instances of] death” (Shiffrin 2012, 5).6 Appealing to this list will not provide a full picture of 
 
could open up what can count as a harm in a troubling way (Velleman 2008). Additional accounts have been presented, 
each of which faces difficult challenges in analyzing the concept of harm in a way that excludes mere desire 
satisfaction, while at the same time including important failings, such as the failure to achieve precious life goals. For 
example, disagreements abound regarding whether a setback to a genius that leaves her at average intelligence counts 
as suffering harm, or whether certain seriously offensive activities cause harm (e.g. protests at funerals).  
5 Some comparative accounts rule out hurts and dissatisfactions by identifying them as de minimis harms (Feinberg 
1984, 51). 
6 Some of the conditions on Shiffrin’s list present problems for accounts of harm either because their status varies with 
circumstance or because some of the conditions—death especially—present notorious puzzles of their own (Feinberg 
1984). Comparative accounts of harm that identify whether a worsened condition constitutes suffering harm by 
comparison to a baseline may not always identify the items on the list as suffering harm. This will depend on the 
location of the baseline. For example, if the baseline is defined historically and a person has been in a disabled 
condition since birth, her being in a disabled condition is not a case of suffering harm. This strikes many as a significant 
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which effects of climate change involve harm and which do not. And for that matter, it will not 
allow for the settling of hard questions such as whether and how to characterize certain instances 
of theft, blocked opportunities, and death as harms.7  
b. Benefit 
In a generic sense of the term, “benefit” refers simply to any advance in a person’s interests 
broadly conceived. It refers to both windfalls and rescues, to sustenance for the starving and 
pleasure for the gourmand, to life-saving medical treatment and to cosmetic plastic surgery. 
Several different senses of benefit ought to be distinguished. (See Feinberg 1984, Chapter 4). 
Feinberg argues that people are prone to equivocate between two importantly different senses of 
“benefit.” The first sense includes what I will call “gratuitous benefit.” As the name suggests, 
gratuitous benefits are those bestowed to beneficiaries who have no entitlement to them by 
benefactors who are under no expectation to bestow them. Receiving a windfall from a stranger 
out of the goodness of her heart, being given a gift out of the blue, or doing someone a favor are 
examples of gratuitous benefits. People can “fail” to give you such a benefit without having an 
effect on your well-being, even if your well-being would have been enhanced by the bestowal 
compared to a relevant baseline. Declining to give you a gift out of the blue simply leaves you 
exactly where you are in terms of your well-being.  
 
problem for comparative accounts. However, comparativists address this concern by appealing to moralized baselines 
or by arguing—as Perry seems to—that the concept of suffering harm implies having your condition worsened by 
some action, omission, or event. The badness of being born disabled (when the parents are not to blame) is serious; 
however, it is simply not a harm.  
7 The disagreement about whether causing harm to someone requires causing their condition to worsen, all things 
considered, is particularly relevant in the context of climate change. For example, Feinberg (1992) argues that if a 
benefit is bestowed at the same time as a person is also made worse off in some respect, the action is not an instance 
of harming if the net effect of the action is positive. Shiffrin disagrees, proposing that being put in a bad condition 
harms no matter what benefit accompanies it.  
  
6 
The second sense of benefit involves the prevention of harm. Since I have not defended a 
complete account of harm, we do not know precisely what counts as a harm prevention. 
However, this sense of benefit can be adequately described using the list of core harms 
provisionally offered by Shiffrin. Very provisionally, a harm prevention is the reduction, 
prevention, or alleviation of suffering harm (“physical injuries, many physical disabilities, many 
mental disabilities, some material inabilities, incidents of pain, the failure or ruin of certain sorts 
of important projects and relationships, some losses, and [some instances of] death” (Shiffrin 
2012, 5). A life-saving rescue involves benefit in the harm prevention sense, as does giving 
money, food or medical care to the starving or otherwise needy, or warning someone that they 
are or will soon be in harm’s way. I will refer to benefit in the harm prevention sense as “harm 
prevention” throughout this paper.  
c. Asymmetry 
The problem of equivocation between the two senses of ‘benefit’—“gratuitous benefit” and 
“harm prevention”—presents an opportunity to identify an asymmetry between preventing harm 
and bestowing benefits. Feinberg identifies several instances of equivocation in legal and moral 
arguments about Bad Samaritan Laws, which legally require the performance of easy rescues of 
people who are in peril. Consider the “Enforced Benevolence Argument” that holds that Bad 
Samaritan Laws have the absurd and illiberal implication of making charity mandatory. This 
argument holds that because the failure to prevent harm is merely a failure to (gratuitously) 
benefit, the victim has no more claim to an easy rescue than a stranger has to a charitable gift. 
James Barr Ames argued in 1908:  
…however revolting the conduct of man who declined to interfere, he was in no way 
responsible for the perilous situation; he did not increase the jeopardy; he simply failed to 
confer a benefit upon a stranger. As the law stands today, there would be no legal 
liability, either civilly or criminally in…these cases. The law does not compel active 
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benevolence between man and man. It is left to one’s conscience whether he shall be a 
good Samaritan or not. (cited in Feinberg 1984, 135; emphasis is Feinberg’s)  
 
Based on this argument, Feinberg proposes that Ames would equate rescuing another person 
with bestowing a windfall profit or walking up to a stranger on the street and giving him a $100 
bill.  
Feinberg argues that the Enforced Benevolence Argument equivocates between benefit in the 
harm prevention sense and benefit in the gratuitous sense, obscuring an important moral 
difference between bestowing benefits and preventing harm. Rescuing a child from drowning in 
a puddle is not a mere benefit, because encountering a child facing utter disaster presents a 
significant harm and thus very strong reasons for coming to her aid. Preventing death and injury 
has a higher moral importance than does giving cash to a decently well-off stranger, i.e. 
providing a gratuitous benefit. The moral significance of preventing harm is that one has a duty 
to do so when it can be done easily or without harm to the rescuer.  
What I am calling the moral asymmetry between harm and benefit can be understood in 
different ways. For Feinberg, the moral asymmetry tracks the duties people have. The clarity and 
stringency of the moral duty to rescue declines along with the severity of the harm:  
As we…weaken the severity or probability of the threatened harm, the model of gratuity 
begins to take on plausibility. One stranger has a clear moral duty to make an easy rescue 
of another threatened with death, or to notify police or an ambulance when he perceives 
another under attack…, but he has a less stringent duty, or no duty at all, to walk to the 
corner drugstore to buy a Band-Aid for a stranger who has just cut his finger and finds 
the interruption of his activities inconvenient. (Feinberg 1984, 141)  
 
As I interpret him, Feinberg would consider the provision of a Band-Aid for a stranger who has 
inconveniently nicked his finger a gratuitous benefit, which the passerby has no duty to provide. 
Providing that benefit would be considerate and kind but is beyond moral requirement. It will be 
difficult or impossible to pinpoint precisely when the severity of an injury gives rise to a duty to 
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easy rescue. Despite the availability of hard cases, I think the difference between a nick and a 
gash, between inconvenience and jeopardy, is clear enough to see the asymmetry. 
Shiffrin’s explains the moral asymmetry between harm and benefit in terms of the strength of 
the moral “pull” that harm and harm prevention have on us compared to the bestowal or loss of 
what she calls “pure benefits”—any benefit that does not involve the prevention of harm, of 
which gratuitous benefits are a class (Shiffrin, 199: 124).  Pure benefits include, for example, the 
special duties of parents to give their children birthday gifts or fund education beyond what is 
required for living a decent life—benefits that are far from gratuitous. It is not always the case 
that pure benefits—in Shiffrin’s sense—present us with weaker reasons relative to harms. At 
some point, the moral significance of harm can be overridden by important and life-enhancing 
pure benefits. Some pure benefits are of incredible importance either because they matter so 
much to people’s way or quality of life or because of the entitlements people have to the benefits 
stemming from promises made or special relationships.8  
Whether we adopt Shiffrin’s or Feinberg’s account of the moral asymmetry, it is highly 
plausible that such asymmetry exists. Our moral reasons to prevent harm are generally—but not 
always—much stronger than our moral reasons to provide gratuitous benefits and some pure 
benefits. 
d. Harm/benefit asymmetry in climate change 
Now that we have established at least a provisional account of harm, benefit, and their moral 
asymmetry, I will consider how this asymmetry arises in the context of climate change. In order 
 
8 The difference between these accounts may be simple semantics, as the loss of pure benefits that Shiffrin would 
count as highly important (breaking a promise or failing to give your child a birthday gift), may be counted as harms 
by Feinberg, as they setback important interests in a way that violates a right.  
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to draw out the asymmetry, I will begin with an over-simplified and hypothetical proposal for an 
aggressive tax on carbon emissions. The Aggressive Carbon Tax would increase the cost of 
fossil fuels in an effort to restrict fossil fuel use, utilizing market forces to help invigorate a 
market in renewable energies, and to ultimately reduce climate change.9 For the sake of 
demonstration and simplicity, I will consider a small slice of the larger puzzle by comparing the 
profits lost to an oil company from the carbon tax today to the reduction of climate change 
impacts on a coastal city in Bangladesh in the future. I argue that many of the impacts of climate 
change on coastal Bangladesh involve harms and that many of the impacts of The Aggressive 
Carbon Tax on The Oil Company involve failures to gratuitously benefit. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that there are harms, gratuitous benefits, and important benefits on 
both sides of the equation. For example, lower and middle class consumers may suffer harm, if 
fuel prices increase.  
To begin, the coastal impacts of climate change expected in Bangladesh from sea level rise 
and hurricanes involve serious harms to many people:  
Most countries in South, Southeast, and East Asia are particularly vulnerable to sea level 
rise due to rapid economic growth and coastward migration of people into urban coastal 
areas together with high rates of anthropogenic subsidence [the lowering of land surface 
elevation] in deltas where many of the densely populated areas are located. (IPCC 2014a, 
382) 
 
These impacts could be particularly severe due to both socio-economic drivers and Bangladesh’s 
inability to afford the costs of adaptation. Bangladesh faces a $25 billion (US) adaptation deficit 
when it comes specifically to hurricanes (IPCC 2014a).  
 
9 I am using the Aggressive Carbon Tax scenario to illustrate a point; it is not offered as a proposal for a policy 
instrument, nor is it defended as such. I consider it only to identify how harm/benefit asymmetries arise in the climate 
change context. Fully evaluating the Aggressive Carbon Tax would be a complex project that would require taking 
into account the costs and feasibility of adaptation, comparison of the costs and benefits of the tax to current 
generations to the reduced residual climate damages in the future, as well as any side effects involved. 
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Coastal impacts from climate change could have a variety of effects on food production, 
basic power, water and transportation infrastructure, as well as health. In addition, the growing 
level of exposure could lead to the displacement of human settlements and forced migration. 
Food production is threatened by both seawater intrusion into agricultural lands and the effects of 
climate change on fisheries. Mortality, morbidity and bodily injuries are expected because of 
hurricanes and flooding events. Sea level rise is predicted to lead to an increase in disease 
vectors (IPCC 2014a, 383). The Bangladeshis could face a litany of bad health effects, bodily 
injury and death from climate change impacts. In short, future coastal Bangladeshis stand to lose 
their lives, health, homes, businesses, agricultural lands, and places of cultural significance to 
flooding and storm surges. Most of these impacts involve bad conditions on the provisional list 
of harms that any theory of harm would identify as harms—at least in some respect. 
The effects of The Aggressive Carbon Tax on The Oil Company could result in lost profits, 
pay cuts, and lay-offs as well as price increases for consumers. In the extreme case, it could put 
the company out of business. Losses to stakeholders in The Oil Company involve a mix of harms 
and failures to benefit, but I argue that those failures to benefit are not particularly morally 
serious.  
First, a question we must ask is, would stakeholders of The Oil Company be put in a 
condition of harm by the imposition of the Aggressive Carbon Tax? The effects of the carbon tax 
could certainly negatively impact some people. Employees of The Oil Company could face pay 
cuts or lay-offs; depending on employment opportunities and the social safety nets of the country 
they live in, they could be pushed into destitution. Increased fuel prices have a range of effects 
on the lives of consumers. Increasing the cost of fuel makes it more expensive to cook food, to 
heat homes, and to get to work. This could have a dire impact on the lives of the poor and middle 
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class who would have to reevaluate their household budgets and would possibly face hard 
tradeoffs between buying food and heating their homes. Increased fuel costs could also affect 
consumer’s ability to participate in activities that enhance their lives, as recreation and travel 
may become more expensive and have even greater opportunity costs.10  
At the same time, however, the Aggressive Carbon Tax could open up markets in renewable 
energy and energy efficiency, resulting in lowered energy prices and/or job creation in 
alternative energy markets. The extent of the harms and benefits of growth in the alternative 
energy market is uncertain in the realm of the economy and politics as well as in terms of 
innovation, learning and technological change. Another beneficial side effect of the policy 
involves the reduction of pollution in urban areas, reducing harms and saving costs of pollution-
related health issues. (See Thompson et al. 2014, 921). For example, the annual cost of air 
pollution from the energy production sector in the US in 2011 was estimated at $131 billion (US) 
(Jaramillo and Muller 2016).  
As is often the case, the loss of profit to the Oil Company from taxes involves a mixed bag of 
harms and failures to benefit. Many of the effects of the carbon tax involve failures to 
gratuitously or purely benefit, which are losses that do not involve suffering harm. Some losses 
in income affect one’s ability to purchase luxury items without affecting basic needs. 
Accordingly, some losses suffered by members of the Oil Company’s management, CEOs, 
employees, and consumers from pay cuts, lay-offs, and price hikes involve failures to 
(gratuitously) benefit. Given the moral asymmetry between harms and benefits, those losses that 
involve failures to benefit do not matter morally in the same way, and to the same degree, that 
the harms from the Aggressive Carbon Tax and the harms from climate change do.  
 
10 Thanks to Sara Mrsny for pointing out to me the importance of emphasizing the losses to middle class consumers.  
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But do the benefits outweigh the harms? This depends upon consideration of any special 
reasons for protecting the benefits at stake. Some might argue that some or all losses to The Oil 
Company from The Aggressive Carbon Tax are morally important pure benefits because they 
violate the entitlements of the stakeholders. There are several ways to argue for this conclusion. 
Some argue that certain companies in developed countries have a right to carry on with their 
business-as-usual emissions. These so-called “grandfathering arguments” appeal, at least in 
spirit, to John Locke and Robert Nozick. Such a perspective contends that established companies 
have a “right to prolong current emissions levels into the future and that such ‘squatters’ rights’ 
can be derived from common law doctrine of ‘adverse possession’” (Neumayer quoted in 
Bovens 2011, 125).11 However, both Locke and Nozick argue that just property appropriation is 
limited to circumstances in which the situation of others is not worsened (Nozick 1974). Simply 
because a company may have been operating under an assumption of infinite atmospheric 
capacity to store emissions does not provide them a special entitlement to continue business-as-
usual once discovering that continued emissions worsens the situation of others. The relevant 
question, then, is at what point does the company’s emissions worsen the situation of others—
and compared to what baseline?  
It is worth noting that there are several historical examples in which government regulation, 
technological change, or market fluctuation caused some companies to flourish and other 
companies to fail. Consider the change from wood fuels to coal in the early part of the industrial 
revolution; the environmental scarcities that drove the change from whale oil to kerosene for 
lighting lamps in the 19th century; and the failure of companies that mined and sold asbestos 
 
11 See Bovens (2011) for discussion of this idea. See also Weikard (2017). 
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before it was banned by the US government in 1989.12 It seems hyperbolic to say that these 
company’s stakeholders had an entitlement to hold the social, environmental, and technological 
context static so that they could continue to operate business as usual. These changes are part of 
the risk that companies take on when doing business in conditions of environmental scarcity, 
government commitment to public safety, and technological innovation.  
A second argument to the conclusion that the carbon tax violates the entitlements of The Oil 
Company’s stakeholders is inspired by classical liberal arguments offered by Milton Friedman 
and F.A. Hayek, among others. These arguments contend that the carbon tax is illegitimate 
because it is an untoward restriction on the economic liberties of the Oil Company’s 
stakeholders. But Hayek, at least, allows for government regulation that impinges economic 
liberties in emergency circumstances (Hayek 1960, 130). So the question becomes: Is climate 
change a great enough emergency to justify market regulation? It is possible, in principle, that no 
entitlements are violated if the carbon tax is justified as an emergency prevention measure.  
If the oil company is not entitled to the lost profits or the natural resources that keep them in 
business, then many of the losses to the company’s stakeholders from the carbon tax policy 
involve a failure to receive a benefit, which should not merit consideration in the same way 
harms do and which do not bear special weight because of existing entitlements. The impacts to 
the Bangladeshis and to those potentially made destitute by the Aggressive Carbon Tax count as 
harms. This being the case, a morally significant asymmetry exists in the effects of the 
Aggressive Carbon Tax: we have stronger reasons to prevent the harms than to prevent the 
failure to receive mere benefits.  
 
12 Thanks to Chris Field for pointing out these examples to me.  
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3. Aggregating harms and benefits? 
Traditional cost-benefit analysis does not differentiate between preventing harm or harming, 
and benefiting or failing to benefit. The trouble with economic methods is that the costs and 
benefits are quite generic, in the sense that costs are identified with any setback and benefits are 
identified with any advance in well-being. This generic sense of cost and benefit is presented in 
the climate change economics literature as an effective way to measure and compare diverse 
effects. This generic treatment assumes that costs and benefits are symmetrical: a benefit is just a 
cost with a positive valence and vice versa. Costs and benefits in this case are understood simply 
as downward and upward movements along a scale of well-being. Equal movements along the 
scale are equivalent to each other whether or not one increase involves a large cash gift and the 
other involves rescuing a drowning child. The moral asymmetry between benefit and the harm 
prevention suggests that these equal movements along a scale should be treated differently 
because the reasons in favor of rescuing the child are stronger than the reasons to give the gift. 
In my view, the problem with this result is not that there is something morally suspect about 
the claim that monetary gains can cancel out malnutrition, morbidity, and death. I will argue 
below that it is at least possible that trade-offs can be made between economic productivity and 
human health (e.g. when the economic loss is certain and the gains in human health are chancy, 
or when the economic loss is severe and could not be prevented in any other way). The problem 
with CBA is not that it aggregates. The problem is that in its generic understanding of costs and 
benefits, CBA occludes the moral judgment that, all things equal, harms and their prevention 
matter more than benefits. However, I think it is possible to aggregate in a way that is more 
morally sensitive to the distinctions between harms and benefits. One way of doing so simply 
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adjusts the weight given to certain harms. Before I defend this possibility against objections, I’ll 
sketch the general strategy of “asymmetrical aggregation.”  
Just as there are different ways of spelling out the details of what makes harm morally 
significant, several different methods of aggregation could be recommended that take account of 
harm. Among other ways, moral differences between harm and benefit could be factored into the 
analysis: (i) by amending the shape of the aggregation function, (ii) by applying moral weights to 
harm and the prevention of harm, (ii) by measuring and aggregating different effects on disparate 
scales. I will consider each in turn. 
i. Aggregation functions take different shapes. Continuous functions, like the function that 
describes diminishing marginal utility, are represented by curves without any breaks. One 
way to account for harm is to create functions that are continuous but “kinked”. The kink 
results from the point beyond which the shape of the curve changes. For example, a recent 
suggestion made in the context of legal economics is to build thresholds into the aggregation 
function that designate levels of social benefits important enough to override some amount 
of harm to others (Zamir and Medina 2010).13  
ii. More weight could be given to people who experience more harm similar to the way that 
prioritarians assign greater weight to the wellbeing of the worst off (Parfit 1995). For 
example, harms and benefits could be plotted on a continuous concave function, which 
assigns more weight the more serious the harm or benefit.  
iii. If harms and benefits are asymmetrical in a way that makes it difficult to measure them 
along the same scale, they may require measurement on disparate scales (Satz et al. 2013). 
A harm scale could measure differences in the extent or severity of harms regardless of their 
cause, assigning, for example, greater measure to severe harms from an earthquake than to 
harms from cut fingers. A comparable benefit scale could be used to measure the magnitude 
of gratuitous and other pure benefits, assigning, for example, greater measure to important 
education benefits than to an extra piece of candy. The dimensions of harm and benefit, in 
 
13 See also Daniel Halliday (2011). 
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both cases, could be aggregated using different functions that take into account the extend 
the harm and/or benefit effects morally significant aspects of life. This approach involves a 
level of disaggregation in the sense that it separates out component parts of the total 
outcome. Informative comparisons can be made across the disparate scales. People can rank 
the relative importance of marginal changes of different sizes along the scales. For example, 
a large marginal change on the benefit scale may rank higher than a tiny marginal change on 
the harm scale.  
a. An objection: getting the numbers right 
An important objection to morally sensitive aggregation in defense of more traditional CBA 
should now be considered. Take the suggestion for assigning greater moral weight as the 
seriousness of the harm increases (ii). Aiding the seriously injured should be given more weight 
than aiding a person with a scratched finger, as Feinberg suggests in comparing the strength of 
the duty to aid (Feinberg, 1984, 141). Barbara Fried considers a similar argument for a 
continuous aggregation function that applies greater weight the more serious the harm. 14 She 
offers this objection:  
If the argument is that serious harms are, well, a lot more serious, that obvious truth 
should be reflected in the subjective disutility that individuals assign to serious and trivial 
harms respectively. That is to say, a properly done cost/benefit calculus based on 
subjective preferences would normally assume steeply increasing marginal disutility as 
one moves up the scale of harms. (Fried 2012, 63)15 
 
 
14 Fried discusses a form of threshold deontology that is adopted by thinkers in the contractualist tradition. (Fried 2012, 
62). 
15 Fried also mentions other important objections to weighting harms, which I do not have space to consider in this 
paper. First, there is a very serious problem concerning how to determine what harms weigh under any criteria. Second, 
she raises concern about paternalism and perfectionism in setting the relative weight of harm either according to what 
one thinks people will prefer in the future or what they ought to prefer (Fried 2012, 63). This point about paternalism 
draws on the connection between preferences and autonomy. If people’s welfare turns out to be different from what 
they prefer, the threat of paternalism is live. However, this is not obvious and a defense of understanding autonomy 
in terms of people’s preferences is sorely needed (Herzog 2000, 914). 
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Fried’s point here is not that asymmetries between harms and benefits do not exist, but that those 
asymmetries would already be captured when measuring well-being adequately. In other words, 
if you just get the numbers right in the first place, the difference in moral significance is captured 
and plain old addition will do. Indeed, many of the intuitive problems that come up in discussing 
the harm/benefit asymmetry can be assuaged by getting the numbers right. We can explain to a 
large extent why we care less about the billionaire’s loss or gain of $1,000 than we care about 
broken arms just by getting the numbers right. The broken arm matters more because it has a 
greater effect on the well-being of the injured party than the loss or gain of $1,000 to the 
billionaire. For that matter, we can learn a lot about the effects of different climate polices, if we 
get the numbers right for The Oil Company’s lost profit and the losses from a future hurricane in 
Bangladesh. This is especially so if getting the numbers right involves correcting discrepancies 
in non-market damage estimates of disasters that affect poor regions. 
I agree with Fried that getting the numbers right can take us a long way. However, there are 
crucial problems with using subjective preferences as a metric for doing so, as is the practice 
among many economists. An obvious problem is that people sometimes prefer bizarre, 
monstrous, and trivial things that would be better left out of the calculus applied to public 
policies.16 A less obvious problem is that people’s preferences do not necessarily track the claims 
they have on others for assistance. Thomas Scanlon gives the example of a religious devotee 
who, in the face of starvation, would give up food in order to build a monument to his god (1975, 
 
16 Another problem with preferences is that people disagree about the consequences of the policies that would combat 
climate change and about the consequences of the activities that cause climate change (Hausman, McPherson, and 
Satz 2016, 285). People who are climate skeptics likely have no preferences at all regarding the predicted bad 
consequences of the fossil fuel regime, but they may have strong preferences concerning the opportunity costs of 
dedicating resources to combat climate change. There are at least partial fixes for such issues within the preference 
satisfaction metric. Hausman, McPherson, and Satz (2016) consider the argument that satisfying preferences does not 
justify “adhering to preferences that reflect mistaken beliefs” about the badness of a consequence.  
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659). Scanlon argues that the devotee’s urgent need for food generates a stronger claim on those 
who have a duty to assist him regardless of the strength of his preferences for monument 
building.  
Further, such an all-encompassing understanding of economic welfare as preference 
satisfaction has absurd implications for identifying and correcting externalities. Externalities are 
good and bad effects imposed on others that are not captured by market prices paid by 
consumers. For example, if pollution from a waterworks project in an upstream community 
threatens the community downstream, a negative externality is created. Similarly, climate change 
is considered to be a negative externality produced by markets in fossil fuels: “Those who 
produce greenhouse gas emissions are…imposing costs on the world and on future generations, 
but they do not face directly, neither via markets nor in other ways, the full consequences of the 
costs of their actions” (Stern 2007, 27). The externalities that economists (rightly) care about 
involve negative externalities like pollution and other effects that impose important costs on 
people.  
However, if welfare is just whatever people prefer, then there are many more negative 
externalities to consider, many of which would lead to absurd social policy. For example, if 
someone is offended by a Rastafarian’s uncombed hair, there is an externality to correct (Herzog 
2000). If people in same sex relationships offend members of the Westboro Baptist Church, there 
is another externality to correct. If climate change deniers would prefer not hearing about carbon 
dioxide emissions, because they find it annoying, there is another externality to correct. In fact, 
depending on the number offended and the degree of their offense, quite a bit of economic 
welfare understood in terms of people’s preferences is at stake in these negative externalities. 
  
19 
Should these inefficiencies be corrected? Should a Rastafarian or a gay couple be required to pay 
compensation to the offended to correct the externality? Of course not.  
Importantly, economists do not identify externalities when people have preferences about 
each other’s preferences, and they do so often for implicit and perfectly sensible ethical reasons: 
“they identify externalities in ways closely tracing the traditional harm principle of liberal 
theory” (Herzog 2000, 912). Feinberg understands the harm principle to be a type of “liberty 
limiting principle”, which identifies harms and acts of harm to be a valid reason to exercise the 
coercive power of the state by instituting criminal statutes, taxation, licensure etc. In identifying 
externalities, economists implicitly or explicitly distinguish between “harms,” “unjustifiable 
intrusions on others’ interests,” and hurts, “ways of bugging [others] that, however painful, don’t 
give them any legitimate claim against us” (Herzog 200, 913). Indeed, The Stern Review 
suggests that economists capture concerns about preventing harm by correcting externalities:  
Protection from harm is…expressed in many legal structures round the world in terms of 
legal responsibility for damage to the property or well-being of others. This is often 
applied whether or not the individual or firm was knowingly doing harm. A clear 
example is asbestos, whose use was not prohibited when it was placed in buildings with 
the worthy purpose of protecting against the spread of fire. Nevertheless, insurance 
companies are still today paying large sums as compensation for its consequences…This 
version of the ‘polluter pays’ principle that is derived from notions of rights…also arises 
from an efficiency perspective within the standard economic framework. (Stern 2007, 47; 
See also 27-31) 
 
Such a principle arises from an economic framework designed to correct for externalities. 17 If 
externalities are considered to involve harms imposed on others, then differentiating between 
harm and mere dissatisfaction is required. A method other than preference satisfaction will be 
 
17 In my dissertation, I argue pace Stern that the economic theory of externalities does not have the resources to derive 
the polluter pays principle. (See Francis, forthcoming, Chapter 1.) 
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needed, because well-being, at least as it appears to be understood in the context of externalities, 
is an evaluative notion; it can’t be read directly off of what people prefer (Herzog 2000).18  
So, getting the numbers right when it comes to accommodating the moral significance of 
harm within individual welfare functions is harder than Fried suggests. I understand Fried’s 
argument for capturing harm’s moral significance at the level of individual wellbeing and then 
summing as a fourth form of asymmetrical aggregation in need of further exploration. 
4. A qualified defense of aggregation 
a. Human rights and lexical priority 
The morally sensitive aggregation strategy is subject to a serious objection even if the 
numerical weight of harm and benefit is correctly assigned. The strategies for including harm’s 
moral significance in aggregation I suggested above will likely result in different answers than 
conventional cost benefit analysis; however, they still involve aggregation. Aggregation in any 
form is objectionable because it allows harms to some to be offset by benefits to others. Simon 
Caney makes a version of this objection against CBA in the context of climate change. He says:  
In virtue of its aggregative nature, a cost-benefit approach is concerned only with the 
total amount of utility, and therefore the total wealth of current and future generations, 
and it is indifferent to the plight of the very severely disadvantaged if their disutility is 
outweighed by the utility of others (Caney 2010, 170) 
 
For these and other reasons, Caney argues that a human rights approach to assessing climate 
change has several advantages over CBA and, I assume, other aggregative approaches. Caney 
argues that human-caused climate change violates the human rights to life, health, and 
 
18 See also Hausman and McPherson, who argue against a theory of welfare based on “spruced-up” preferences, in 
which “welfare is not the satisfaction of preferences, no matter how spruced up” (2009, 2). 
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subsistence, and that the aim of climate change policy is to stop violating peoples’ human rights 
as much as possible. According to Caney’s ecumenical understanding of human rights, a human 
right is a basic entitlement that each and every person possesses in virtue of their humanity and 
independently from social conventions and social practices (Caney 2010). Caney argues that 
when it comes to a conflict between violating a person’s human rights and other values, like 
economic efficiency or promoting well-being, human rights generally take lexical priority.19 
Lexical priority means that human rights “trump” other values. More specifically, A trumps B 
when any amount of A is more valuable than any amount of B (Satz et al.; See also Raz 1986; 
Griffin 1986). Any number of human rights under threat is more valuable than any amount of, 
for example, economic efficiency or total well-being. The lexical priority of human rights 
requires doing everything we can to not violate human rights or “create threats” to human rights, 
and it requires that we promote other values only when doing so does not threaten human rights 
(Caney 2010, 176 n.38).20 Due to the lexical priority Caney gives to human rights, balancing 
threats to human rights against economic productivity above the human rights threshold is not a 
matter of getting the numbers right because no amount of economic productivity can outweigh 
the disvalue of even a single human rights violation.  
In response to Caney, I provide a qualified defense of aggregation. First, I argue that Caney’s 
assignment of lexical priority to human rights is problematic. I then discuss a qualification 
regarding when aggregation should be suspended or supplemented.  
 
19 Caney describes the lexical priority of human rights as “general,” because he does not think human rights have 
absolute priority. In exceptional cases, violating human rights of the few may be required in order to protect the human 
rights of others (Caney 2010, 165, 174 n.12) 
20 Given that human rights pick out the most basic moral standard, Caney’s human rights approach leaves room for 
other moral ideas and values, including economic efficiency, to be considered once a human rights threshold is 
achieved. Caney’s approach to climate change leaves space for economic methods, but only for effects above the 
human rights threshold.  
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The problem with aggregative methods, on one reading of Caney’s view, is that some 
harms—the ones that involve human rights violations—are incommensurable with other harms 
and benefits. Lexical priority is a weak form of incommensurability. If A is lexically prior to B, 
they cannot be aggregated through addition, because no amount of B can offset any amount of A. 
One strategy for defending aggregation is to deny lexical priority. I will begin by denying the 
lexical priority of life and health over other goods.  
To borrow an example from James Griffin, a person will not likely agree to have his arms 
and legs cut off in exchange for any number of delicious desserts. However, this does not imply 
that there is a general priority rule about sacrificing body parts for gustatory pleasures (i.e. body 
parts trump desserts). It is unlikely that a person would make such a tradeoff because some 
goods, like desserts, become less and less valuable the more they are consumed in quick 
succession. Their value ranges across of series of infinitely diminishing amounts, adding up to a 
small finite number.21 This, Griffin thinks, is a loose sense of incommensurability: “Some values, 
because they diminish, sometimes to nothing, can never be added in a way that will make them 
equal to certain other values” (1977, 45). This, however, does not establish the computational 
break down implied by trumping. Indeed, Griffin suggests he would give his pinky for a 
moderate number of incredibly fancy bottles of wine (1977, 45). Similar things can be said about 
lives and other values. Free solo mountain climbers are willing to risk their life for their sport, 
and some may even trade exhilaration for a shorter life.  
Griffin’s examples have to do with the satisfaction of individuals’ desires when it comes to 
trading the risk of bodily harm for pleasure or excitement. Caney’s claim about lexical priority 
concerns tradeoffs that governments make when setting policy. Examples from public policy 
 
21 John Broome (2010) makes a similar argument.  
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also suggest that the priority rule does not always hold—even though public policies often 
express commitment to protect people’s lives and health. Governments and medical doctors 
make tradeoffs between lives and money every time they decide to spend money on recreation or 
quality-of-life enhancements instead of saving lives. For example, a government may choose to 
allocate resources to expanding the trail system in a public park when it could have spent that 
money on improving highway safety (Harel and Porat 2011). Also, raising the speed limit is 
sometimes justified even though it will likely result in more deaths. Governments routinely 
choose between safety and saving money for use on projects that have nothing to do with safety, 
accepting that some will suffer harms. Griffin puts the point this way:  
We seem willing to exchange length of life for beauty, convenience, excitement. One 
person is willing to accept an exchange of quantity for quality in his own life, and we 
expect governments to accept such an exchange in taking decisions that affect many 
people. We should not like the government to spend so much money on life-saving 
schemes (road improvements, X-ray screening, certain medical research) that life-
enhancing schemes (other medical research, education, art, housing) are abandoned 
(Griffin 1977, 54). 
 
However, in choosing to spend less money on saving lives than on life-enhancement 
through recreation or comfort or convenience, do governments and hospitals create threats to 
human rights? Caney would have to say they do:  
Humans can violate the three human rights [life, health, subsistence] in two different 
ways. The first (and most obvious) route is for humans to emit high levels of greenhouse 
gases and to destroy carbon sinks, which will in turn produce high temperatures, 
increased precipitation, and severe weather events. The second route is for humans to 
design social and political institutions that leave people vulnerable to the physical 
impacts of climate change. Suppose that climate change were nonanthropogenic (and so 
route 1 was inapplicable), but politicians could implement an effective program of 
adaptation and design institutions that would safeguard the vital interests of people in life, 
health, and subsistence but chose not to do so. They could then be said to violate the 
human rights of others to life, health, and subsistence because they would be acting in 
such a way as to create threats to life, health, and subsistence. (Caney 2010, 176 n.38)  
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It is true that legislators and hospital directors could implement policies that safeguarded all (or 
at least more of) the vital interests of people in life, health, and subsistence, if they spent more 
money on safety and lifesaving. This implies that when governments choose to fund recreation 
instead of life-saving policies, they threaten human rights in a morally suspicious way. If this 
were the case, much of what 21st century governments do would be suspect, because finite 
resources require making decisions about whether to spend money to prevent death and injury or 
to spend money to improve people’s lives. When a government could save more lives by 
instituting 30 mph speed limits on the freeway, it seems that the government is threatening 
human rights when it opts instead for the convenience of 65mph. If this is the case, it is highly 
plausible that some threats to human rights are worth imposing for the sake of convenience, 
comfort, excitement, beauty, and quality of life. These actions put the lexical priority of human 
rights over other values into question. Morally significant aggregation that differentiates between 
harm (or for that matter threats to human rights) and benefits (or effects less important than 
threats to human rights) could help policy makers form judgments about when imposing harm is 
justified, when it is excusable, and when it is impermissible. 
b. A qualification: What do the numbers mean? 
Although I have argued that it is possible to conduct aggregation over effects that are 
harm/benefit asymmetrical, there remains a serious practical limitation to aggregation: it 
obscures important information. Consider what we can learn about vulnerability to climate 
change from the estimates of the total damage from two storms: Super Storm Sandy, which 
swept the Caribbean and the east coast of North America in 2012, and Cyclone Nargis in 
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Myanmar in 2008. The total damage estimate of Super Storm Sandy in the US was $71 billion.22 
The total damage estimate of Nargis was just over $10 billion, making it the most destructive 
hurricane to hit the Indian Ocean to date.23 Based on these numbers—which should be compared 
cautiously—Sandy resulted in greater net damages than Nargis by a large factor. 24  
However, the damage assessment looks considerably different when you disaggregate and 
consider the number of lives lost. A total of 222 people died as a result of Super Storm Sandy 
(NOAA 2013), whereas 138,000 people died in Cyclone Nargis (CRED 2009; IPCC 2012). The 
amount of damage from property and infrastructure loss makes up an enormous portion of the 
damages from Sandy—in part because property values are exponentially higher in the US than in 
Myanmar. Estimated damages from Nargis represent the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives.25 
My proposals for asymmetrical aggregation would do a better job of treating the differences in 
the extent of the damages in the two cases by treating the loss of life and certain forms of 
property damage asymmetrically. However, even when aggregation is perfectly possible and 
appropriate, supplementing the net figures with disaggregated information about what makes up 
the net figure—(e.g.) number of lives lost—is called for in order to make what the numbers mean 
explicit.  
 
22  Damage estimate for the USA (NJ, NY, CN), including post-tropical storm and landfall: $71,400,000,000 
(unadjusted USD) (NOAA 2014). 
23 The $10 billion figure was cited in Fritz et al. (2009). The Myanmar government also announced the $10 billion 
figure shortly after the disaster. However, the official disaster database lists damage estimates at an even lower figure 
(Guha-Sapir and Below 2009). 
24 Calculating the economic costs of damages is highly complex. Most damage estimates sum the direct and indirect 
effects of a disaster, rather than relying on macroeconomic data about the disaster’s effects on economic growth. 
Governments differ in their record keeping, as well as in the way estimates are calculated. As disasters are highly 
complex, estimates from different countries and different places will differ in the costs they include, and so are quite 
difficult to adjust and accurately compare. This is the case even when looking at databases specifically designed for 
cross-country analysis (Kousky 2012).  
25 John Nolt (2015) argues that casualties should be used as a measure of climate change impacts. I think this is a step 
in the right direction. However, I do not think that the number of deaths alone is an adequate measure of harm. Many 
people suffering bodily injuries could be quite a bit worse-off, harm-wise, than they would be if they were dead. That 
is, some harms may be worse than death.  
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Consider three reasons for including additional information alongside the results of 
aggregation functions. First, disaggregated information may be more relevant to the goals of a 
given policy. The aim of the policy may not be net savings in monetized damages, but saving 
lives, reducing low-income property damage, or improving overall human well-being. Second, 
disaggregated information is required for transparency about value assumptions.26 This plays an 
especially important role in contexts of disagreement. People disagree about the value of 
culturally significant places and buildings, the value of ecosystems, and about the value of a 
human life. Fine-grained detail is helpful for healthy deliberation about these matters, especially 
when people may disagree with the value assumptions built into the aggregation function. Third, 
policymakers are in a position to make a moral judgment about how resources should be 
distributed, a decision that requires considering more than the net damages. The relative 
importance of other moral factors like distribution, vulnerability, and fairness need to be 
considered explicitly by the people making decisions.27 When comparing the two tropical storms, 
for example, the moral issues of global inequality and protection of the vulnerable come into 
clear focus once the numbers are disaggregated. Disaggregation helps to make the stakes explicit 
in a way that net figures can obscure.  
5. Conclusion: 
My aim in this paper was to present a different way of identifying the limitations of climate 
economics that does not rule out aggregation. My motivation for doing so is that I believe there 
 
26 See Schneider et al. (2000) for recommendations and a discussion of the importance of transparency about values 
for widening the range of possible policies in the face of uncertainty about climatic change.  
27See IPCC (2014b, 220) for a helpful discussion on Multi-Criteria Analysis.  
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is plenty of conceptual space for a view in climate change ethics that is both friendly to 
aggregative economic methods and which takes seriously morally significant factors like 
suffering harm. I showed the modest point that there is moral asymmetry in the climate change 
context that could be aggregated in a way that is morally sensitive. In addition, I explored the 
practical limits of aggregation due to the informational constraints of aggregate figures. Even 
where measurement and aggregation is helpful, aggregation obscures important information 
about value assumptions and the moral significance of the effects in question.    
   
[END] 
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